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Justice Without Law?' is the first serious attempt to explore the
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meaning of the current alternative dispute resolution movement against
the background of that history. 2 The author tells us in his preface that
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AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983).
* Robert Cover has defined the general contours of the study of dispute resolution:

[Tihe term "dispute resolution" is most often used to refer to social
scientific work that typically assumes a functional perspective cutting
across formal and institutional lines. One writes in the area of "dispute
resolution" as soon as one decides that no single institution, rule, technique, or role is the subject of the work, but rather the "dispute" or
"disputing" that might confront many different institutions or components of them.
Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 910 (1979).
When considering the resolution of disputes, it is important to understand the
range of procedures available to an individual when a dispute arises. These procedures
are best understood according to the number of parties involved in resolving the dispute. Thus, one whole set of procedures involves unilateral action by a party to the
dispute. The unilateral action may be referred to either as "lumping it" (the decision of
an aggrieved party not to press the claim), avoidance (the decision of an aggrieved party
to withdraw from the situation that led to the dispute or to terminate the relationship
between the parties to the dispute), or coercion (the decision of one party to impose the
outcome on the other party as, for example, when "self help" is employed).
Another mode of proceeding involves only the two parties to the dispute and is
called a dyadic arrangement. This procedural mode of negotiation involves the two
parties arranging a settlement of the dispute by mutual agreement.
A third set of processes involves the intervention of a third party in the resolution
of the dispute. The nature of the intervention differs according to the specific resolution
pr cedure. In mediation both parties to the dispute agree to the participation of the
third party who helps them to reach an agreement about the dispute. In arbitration
both parties to the dispute agree to the intervention of the third party and also agree
that they will accept that third party's resolution of the issues involved in the dispute.
In adjudication the third party has authority to intervene regardless of the desires of the
disputants and to render and enforce compliance of a judgment resolving the dispute.

(621)
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he worked to understand both the "pattern of rejection of lawyers and
courts" and "why law flourishes at the outer edge of community, where
solitary individuals feel the need to protect themselves against each
other."8 Auerbach concludes that when the legal establishment involves
itself in the alternatives movement for reasons of justice or efficiency it
may be limiting access to law to those who can-afford it.
Although Auerbach's efforts are important and are a significant
contribution to the study of dispute resolution movements, Justice Without Law? fails in a number of ways. By resting his argument on several
unexamined assumptions, by underplaying the significance of the relationship between law and the social order, and most importantly, by
limiting his analysis to the choice between legal and non-legal alternatives, Auerbach shortchanges his readers.
In this review I will introduce the reader to the history of nonlegal dispute resolution presented inJustice Without Law? as well as to
some of the author's primary concerns and assumptions about dispute
resolution in the United States. I will then discuss what I perceive to be
the weaknesses in Auerbach's approach, assumptions, and conclusions.
I.

A

REVIEW OF AUERBACH'S FINDINGS

A.

Overview

Auerbach's concise history of alternatives to courts in the United
States spans 350 years of our history. His short interpretive analysis
uses examples drawn from every century since the seventeenth to illuminate the ways in which the processes of dispute settlement express
personal choices, cultural values, and power disparities in the United
States. The author's objective is to build a model of dispute settlement
history that "may provide clues to the current, and recurrent, enthusiasm for alternatives-and to their limitations in our litigious society." 4
Although Auerbach is a historian and this work deals with materials from the past in a historical sequence, the book is not a pure and
simple history. It is, instead, a comparison of a variety of communities
based on ethnicity, religion, work, profession, and class, and it attempts
to describe the conditions under which dispute settlement preferences
are but "shifting commitments." 5 Although the communities Auerbach
These processes are discussed in more detail in Nader & Todd, Introduction, in
THE DISPUTING PRocEss: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 8-11 (L. Nader & H. Todd eds.
1978).
3 J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at viii.
4 Id. at 14.
5 Id. at 7. Many historians have written about dispute resolution at different peri-
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has chosen vary in a number of important ways, they are all composed
of groups of people who share values, trust, and the desire for harmony. For such communities, "[t]he choice of non-legal alternatives to
adjudication never was a decision to replace power with love, or coercion with cajoling. It was the application of power to serve the common
interest at the expense of competing individual claims." 6
The historical part of Justice Without Law? deals with the evolution of law.7 During the colonial period legal institutions played a relatively minor role in dispute settlement because the colonists were hostile
to external interference that might contribute to community disorganization or that might challenge the basic community value system. Although commercial arbitration evolved as an important force by the
mid-eighteenth century, with the increase in trade and commerce courts
played an increasing role in managing disputes. Legislation accelerated
with the rise of economic and social stratification, increased immigration, and declining church membership. As communities disintegrated,
law replaced the "counter-tradition to legalism"' expressed in mediation and arbitration. The culmination of the evolving system came
when the state itself began to organize alternative dispute settlement
processes in order to allay fears of class warfare and racial discord. The
Civil War marked a change from alternative dispute settlement as an
ideology of community justice to an argument for judicial, efficiency. It
also marked the beginning of the use of alternatives as an external instrument of social control. 9 During the post Civil War period the legalods in our history, but Auerbach's work, which is apparently the first history to span
the period from the colonial settlements to the present, adopts a comparative approach.
For other recent comparative historical works, see R. KAGAN, LAWSUITS AND LrrTGANTS IN CASTILE 1500-1700 (1981); M. SHAPIRO, COURTS (1981). Auerbach's use
of comparison is more controlled than Shapiro's but less contextual than that of Kagan,
who is also a historian. For a discussion of the use of comparison in relation to legal
change, see Nader, A Comparative Perspective on Legal Evolution, Revolution, and
Devolution, 81 MICH. L. REV. 993 (1983).
6 J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 16.
7 Evolutionary studies of law have been sporadic since the work of Sir Henry
Maine: H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (London 1861). More recently, however, there have
been a number of studies covering the evolution of legal procedures. See, e.g., Abel,
Western Courts in Non-Western Settings: Patterns of Court Use in Colonial and NeoColonial Africa, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 167 (S. Burman & B. Harrell-Bond eds.
1979); Aubert, Law as a Way of Resolving Conflicts: The Case of a Small Industrialized Society, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 282 (L. Nader ed. 1969); Friedman &
Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10
LAW & Soc'y REV. 267 (1976).
J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 4.
9 For a recent analysis of the use of alternative dispute mechanisms as an external
instrument of social control, see 1 & 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel
ed. 1982). Of particular relevance is Hofrichter, NeighborhoodJustice and the Social
Control Problems of American Capitalism:A Perspective, in 1 THE POLITICS OF IN-
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ization of alternatives became state policy. These alternatives, Auerbach
tells us, were disconnected from any one community, and communal
ideologies of mediation and arbitration were used to conceal the realities of the unequal power of the disputing parties. Alternatives were
used in an effort to legitimate a legal system that had failed to achieve
equal justice.1 0
Throughout this history Auerbach argues that although alternatives arise in almost every generation they are destined to fail:
There is every reason why the values that historically are
associated with informal justice should remain compelling:
especially the preference for trust, harmony, and reciprocity
within a communal setting. These are not, however, the values that American society encourages or sustains; in their absence there is no effective alternative to legal institutions."'
Rather he asserts that "[tihe American deification of individual rights
requires an accessible legal system for their protection."1 2 But let me
move to a more detailed summary of the book.
B. Non-legal Alternatives During Three Periods
The heart of Auerbach's book is his examination of three different
kinds of community and three different periods in American history
that "testify to a persistent counter-tradition to legalism."1 " Auerbach
discusses a number of different types of communities: colonial, Christian utopian, and immigrant. The colonial communities (Christians,
utopians, Dutch settlers in New Amsterdam, or merchants), we are
told, preferred to live within a communal framework that Auerbach
believes made state law unnecessary, 4 dangerous, or superfluous. The
first colonies were self-contained communities that did not see social
advantage to individual assertiveness and perceived deviance and conflict as a threat to community stability. Conflict was either suppressed
or dealt with through mediation. These communities were characterized by periods of either enforced harmony or open schism. "Puritan
FORMAL JUsTIcE 207 (R. Abel ed. 1982).
'0 This period was rich in critiques of the legal system perhaps culminating in
Roscoe Pound's 1906 address to the American Bar Association: Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfactionwith the Administration ofJustice, 29 REP. A.B.A., pt. 1, 395
(1906).
11 J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 145.
12

Id.

is Id. at 4.
14 See id. at 19 ("The tighter the communal bonds, the less need there was for
lawyers or courts.").
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religious values provided the primary framework for non-legal dispute
'
settlement,1 15 and "[c]ommunal harmony was the supreme value." 16
Civil and religious functions were fused, and each church functioned as
a court for a wide range of disputes from slander and theft to questions
of business ethics.1" In this context, legal dispute settlement was explicitly discouraged.
Dedham, a Massachusetts town founded in 1636, provides an example of such a colonial community. Its residents combined Puritan
Christian theology with a utopian experiment built on the ideals of love
and harmony. Dedhamites resolved their disputes without lawyers or
courts and settled disagreements with neighboring villages "by arbitration, mediation, 'or any other peaceable way.' "18 In the neighboring
community of Sudbury, an English open-field village, communal land
ownership, rather than Christian utopianism, provided the framework
for a renunciation of legal adjudication that lasted nearly two decades.19
Auerbach reports that, rather than being unique, the Dedham-Sudbury
pattern of non-legal dispute settlement was tried in several colonies beyond Massachusetts, including Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina.2" The best known example outside of New England was undoubtedly the Quakers, who, like the Puritans, "shaped . . .patterns
of dispute settlement in the interest of group harmony."21
But harbingers of future trends were to be found in the colonial
setting as well. Two litigious Massachusetts towns, Plymouth and Salem, provide us with examples of towns where "law not only measured
the extent of community fragmentation; it provided the strongest possibility of social cohesion." 22 The ingredients were there: "a high level of
commercial activity, religious diversity, and private land ownership." 28
These were towns "impelled toward law, at the risk of an intolerable
level of unresolved conflict."2 4 Auerbach notes a crucial variable when
he writes, "As commercial activity multiplied relationships with the
world beyond Plymouth, and attracted a transient laboring population,
informal mechanisms of accommodation and compromise were unavail15

Id. at 21.

'6

Id. at 22.

17

See id. at 22-23.

18 Id. at 25. See M.

ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND
TowNs IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1970) for an examination of this drive within
the religious context of eighteenth century villagers.
19 See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 26-27.
20 Id. at 27.
21 Id.
at 29.
22 Id. at 37.
23 Id. at 36.
24

Id. at 37.
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ing."2 5 Dispute settlement increasingly became a judicial function as
individual values and commercial gain became salient and communal
harmony weakened. Auerbach believes that "[t]he emergence of a pervasive legal culture, yet the persistence within it of stubborn pockets of
resistance to legalization," continues even in contemporary America to
express "a persistent cultural dialectic between individuals and their
communities." 2 6
There is a direction to the social development being described: toward individualism, assertive contentiousness, and legalization. To focus on the inevitability of this social development misses the point that
Auerbach is making: Although the pattern of use changed dramatically
in the nineteenth century, alternative dispute settlement lasted even after social changes of modernization and commercialization encouraged
legal development.
In the first half of the nineteenth century more than a hundred
utopian communities attracted people who did not wish to participate
in the secular and materialistic changes in American communities. 7
Their motives were political, religious, and cultural. Religious utopians
belonged to dissenting Protestant sects such as the Shakers and the Seventh Day Baptists. The political utopians preferred a variety of communities-socialist, anarchist, and communist-to a competitive economy and the factory system. Litigation was rejected as violent. The
philosophy of dispute resolution emphasized the mutual and consensual, not the individual and adversarial values. Community peer pressure rather than state pressure prevailed. One of the most successful
utopian experiments was the Mormon community, which built a socialist commonwealth, a self-governing theocratic state that fused morality,
religion, and politics. 28 United States government power, however, was
successful in fragmenting Mormonism so that it was reduced to a religion placed well within a secular society. This disruption of Mormon
society made its formerly pervasive methods of dispute settlement an
issue of relatively minor importance.
In Auerbach's story, these antebellum utopian communities
marked the end of the beginning in the history of American efforts to
escape from formal legal institutions. The Civil War was a turning
point: "beyond [the Civil War], amid the turbulence of race and labor
relations, alternative dispute settlement was reshaped," and, "in the
second half of the nineteenth century, the purposes (if not the forms) of
21 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See

at 38.
at 42.
at 49.
id. at 54-56.
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alternative dispute settlement were redefined." 9 Fears of racial hostility and class warfare encouraged arbitration as a remedy for the congestive breakdown of the court system and as an externally imposed
deterrent to social conflict. Until the Civil War, alternative dispute settlement had expressed an ideology.of community justice. Thereafter,
according to Auerbach, it became an external instrument of social control and a way of increasing judicial efficiency."0
C.

Non-legal Alternatives as an Arm of the State-The Precursors

After the Civil War, the Freedman's Bureau was established to
manage the transition from slavery to freedom. This government
agency was confronted with a large volume of civil disputes between
former masters and their newly freed slaves. Arbitration tribunals for
labor-contract disputes involving less than $200 were devised to deal
with the volume. Given the unequal bargaining power, Auerbach contends that this diversion to arbitration in the main served the interest of
the planters, with little benefit to the freeman: "Informality, in a social
setting of disparate power relations, inevitably served the interests of
the dominant group."8 1 Alternative dispute settlement ultimately expressed the values of the White power structure, not of the Blacks who
seldom participated as equals in these settlement procedures. 2 In this
example, Auerbach exposes the vulnerability of non-legal dispute settlement without community autonomy. "The freedmen, shunted from law
courts to arbitration tribunals . . . were powerless in both settings

...
. Neither legality nor informality could remedy the effects of racial discrimination or economic inequality."3 3
A similar use of alternative dispute settlement appears during the
period of labor-management conflict at the end of the nineteenth century, when there was a "search for a peaceful alternative to industrial
violence.""' The impetus was the railroad strikes and riots during the
violent summer of 1877. "Without arbitration of industrial disputes
29

Id. at 57.

So

See id.

SI Id. at 59. The observation that informality serves the interests of the dominant

group has been documented repeatedly. See generally No AccEss TO LAW (L. Nader
ed. 1980). But this observation is consistently ignored in policy recommendations. As
Richards Adams has observed, Americans are uncomfortable with the notion of power
inequality "because of our long emphasis on the fundamental legal equality of man
under [our Constitution.]" Adams, Power in Human Societies: A Synthesis, in THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF POWER 407, 409 (R. Fogelson & R. Adams eds. 1977).
2 See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 59-60.
3 Id. at 60.
3 Id.
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[proponents] feared the national disaster of another civil war, this time
between capital and labor.""5 Industrial arbitration tribunals were to
be the answer to class conflict-a solution that was at first considered
suspect by both workers and employers, but which was embraced by
middle-class reformers. Auerbach contends that "[i]ndustrial arbitration
remained a panacea offered by anxious middle-class professionals who
felt dangerously squeezed between capital and labor."3 " The solution
was limited, however, because "[p]roponents of harmony through arbitration persistently evaded the basic issues of unequal wealth and
power."3 7 As in the case of arbitrations between Blacks and Southern
White property owners, "[t]he rampant inequalities that pervaded labor-management relations molded the industrial arbitration process."38
The road had forked; alternative dispute settlement, once a voluntary expression of communal cohesion, now became an instrument of
external regulation and control. In both of Auerbach's examples, the
resort to arbitration capitalized on the values of harmony that were
associated with non-legality and a pre-urban, agricultural society.
At the close of the nineteenth century, however, in the midst of
rapid industrialization, class conflict, economic recession, political instability, and unprecedented immigration, the rule of law provided a way
of binding these new diverse interests. The use of law thus became an
indicator of absorption into American society. At the same time, the
new immigrants lived in a context where personal relationships were
based on continuing relations that would be sabotaged by the intrusion
of a legality that promoted new, inconsistent values.
For new immigrants, the forms of dispute settlement varied. Italian, Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian immigrants used the padrone system in which a powerful authority figure provided employment-brokering and social services." The same person also arbitrated disputes-at
least until conflict worked its way out of the enclave into the wider
society of court law. These and other immigrant groups moved away
from their traditional forms of dispute settlement to the legal norms of
the state as they gradually became acculturated.
On the other hand, Scandinavian immigrants, who had a long history of conciliation, maintained their conciliation proceedings, as did
the Chinese within Chinatowns and the Jews on the Lower East Side
of New York. Chinese mediation and Jewish arbitration proved to be
35 Id.

36 Id. at 64.
37 Id.

" Id. at 65.
Id. at 70-71.

39
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particularly resistant to acculturation. The Chinese preference for mediation was strengthened by the poor treatment they received in the
American legal system as defendants or victims. It was not until after
World War II that traditional Chinese mediation began to show signs
of breakdown. As the elders became less able to solve more systemic
problems, disputes were increasingly resolved through the rule of law.'0
In the case of American Jews, we are told that the retention of
disputes within the Jewish community was motivated in part by the
desire to maintain their distinct identity as a community within the
state.4 1 Arbitration was the means by which both commercial and religious disputes were resolved in the Lower East Side in New York, and
in Baltimore. At first community leaders looked to harmony through
arbitration; later, dispute settlement was to function as an instrument
of acculturation. Jewish arbitration tribunals faded in importance after
World War I under the pressure of the "wrenching transition from the
Old World to the New"' 2 and were "overwhelmed by a new agenda of
international issues relating to Zionism and statehood.' 43 By 1930, the
Jewish Conciliation Court of America was incorporated "to preserve
harmony, achieve respectability, and prod immigrants along the road to
Americanization,"" until finally "acculturation decisively rearranged
their commitment to law."' 45 Children of immigrant Jewish parents entered the legal profession in great numbers, with the select among them
like Felix Frankfurter moving into the highest positions in the legal
establishment.
Auerbach believes that all of these immigrant groups tried to replicate earlier models of community; the Scandinavians, the Chinese, the
Jews, and others believed that conflict among community members
should be resolved within the community. With the disappearance of
community (and I might add with the increase in conflict between
strangers) litigiousness became acceptable behavior. Conflict was to be
resolved in American institutions rather than in exclusive communities.
D.

Professional Interest in Non-legal Alternatives

With the turn of the century, criticism of the American legal system accelerated. Roscoe Pound, professor of law at Harvard University,
criticized the judicial system for its congested courts, endemic delay,
40 For a discussion of this history, see id. at 73-76.
41

Id. at 77.

42 Id. at 83.
4S

Id. at 81.

44 Id. at 84.
45 Id. at 89.

630

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:621

expense, lack of access, and a substantive law that was obsolete."' By
the second decade of this century legal reform was visible: Small claims
courts, public defenders, legal aid societies, industrial accident commissions, and the like, plus an expanded regulatory apparatus were
formed. Legal reform had its limits, however, as Roscoe Pound warned
in 1916,"' who reflected a dissatisfaction with legal institutions that
would increase over the next two decades.
Auerbach provides two significant examples from the early twentieth century of dispute resolution outside of the judicial system. The
first example is the conciliation movement, begun in Cleveland in 1913
and intended to make justice more available to those unable to afford
the high costs of legal services.4 Conciliation was most importantly different from the judicial system in two ways: its procedures were informal and its jurisdiction was limited to claims with a low value.4 9 Conciliation, however, did not develop from within the communities it was
intended to serve. Rather, it was established for low-income communities by the legal establishment itself in order to remove trivial claims
from the judicial system. 50 Auerbach concludes that conciliation resulted in "a two-tier justice system, with conciliation as an alternative
for those who could not afford to buy the protection offered by the legal
system. '
.
The second example of non-legal dispute settlement was commercial arbitration, which flourished during the early twentieth century because commercial interests preferred arbitration in forums where businessmen could resolve disputes according to trade practice rather than
legal principle. Commercial arbitration, therefore, differed significantly
from conciliation because arbitration, rather than being externally imposed, was "revived as the indigenous demand of powerful economic
groups who formed their own consensual communities of profit."52 Arbitration was unable, however, to function independently of the legal
system. A compromise of sorts was reached between the business and
legal communities first by establishing binding arbitration agreements
that "combined the benign fiction of voluntary consent with the strin46 Id. at 95. See Pound, supra note 10; Pound, The Administration ofJustice in

the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302 (1913).
47 J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 96 (citing Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal
Action, 3 A.B.A. J. 55, 55-57 (1917)).
48 J.AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 97.
49 Id.

50 See id. at 99-100.
51 Id. at 100-01.
52 Id. at 101. Auerbach's discussion of the dynamics of this commercial community is reminiscent of his discussion of colonial religious communities. Compare id. at
101-05 (commercial community) with id. at 20-32 (colonial religious communities).
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5 and, in 1926, by the formation of
gent reality of legal enforcement"M
the American Arbitration Association, an organization staffed largely
by lawyers and committed to legalizing the arbitration process." Concluding that such legalization has become "inexorable in our modern
culture," Auerbach states that commercial arbitration "could not have
flourished without legal support, which simultaneously constricted its
potential as an alternative dispute-settlement system."55
By 1958, Auerbach continues, the centrality of law in American
society was complete, but once again law reformers began to worry
about the capacity of the American legal system to provide equal justice.5 6 The classic reforms of the early twentieth century-small claims
court, legal aid, and administrative agencies-had failed to solve the
problems of access to justice. Once again reformers looked to alternative
dispute resolution processes for solutions. Auerbach discerns two different approaches in this later reform movement. The first had a populist
orientation and sought to empower people within a community setting.57 The second promoted speed and flexibility and was advocated by
a legal community that hoped to reduce popular dissatisfaction by improving management of the legal system.58
Auerbach argues that "[t]he decisive moment in the legalization of
informal alternatives" came in 1976, at the National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,

53

Id. at 105.

See id. at 108-11. The American Arbitration Association actually was formed
with the merger of two groups: the Arbitration Society of America and the Arbitration
Foundation. The Arbitration Society had been founded by prominent members of the
bar, while the Arbitration Foundation was founded by people interested in non-legal
commercial arbitration. See id. at 106-08. The merger was clearly a victory for the
legal profession. See id. at 108-11.
55 Id. at 114.
" Id. at 115. The terms "centrality" and "marginality" are used in different ways
in the literature. It appears that Auerbach uses the term centrality to refer to increasing
controlling power of the law. Professor Hurst uses the term marginality in another
context where he says: "Nineteenth-century litigation involved only limited sectors of
the society in any bulk. This relative marginality of the litigious process also characterized the years after 1950....
[L]awsuits... touched only limited parts of the dense,
diverse activity of the business world." Hurst, The Functions of Courts in the United
States, 1950-1980, 15 LAW & Soc'y Rv. 401, 420 (1980). Furthermore, the array of
litigating parties differed little after 1950 from that of earlier decades. Thus Hurst
notes that in the nineteenth-century United States, there were no more merchants suing
fellow merchants than there were in the twentieth-century dockets, and people of small
means were not often plaintiffs in other than tort or family matters. Id. at 421.
5' The following reform proposals are examples of this first approach: the neighborhood "reconciliation boards" of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the American
Friends Service Committee plan, and Richard Danzig's proposal of an African tribal
moot system. See J. AUERBAcH, supra note 1, at 116-19.
5 See id. at 123.
5
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when Chief Justice Burger declared that alternative dispute settlement
was an idea whose time had come.59 This interest in alternatives to
adjudication focused on disadvantaged citizens who recently had begun
to litigate successfully: consumers, prisoners, and those disadvantaged
by race, class, age, or national origin were made to trade legal redress
for speed and efficiency. In fact, Auerbach argues forcefully that informal dispute processes were encouraged as a result of victories in court
by disadvantaged groups." Auerbach contends finally that "[tihe poverty line largely determined [the] clientele" of the new informal justice."1 Informal justice was to be for the underclass, and community
fragmentation, not community cohesion, was the primary criterion.
The alternative projects that developed in response to the Pound
Conference were essentially extensions of the existing justice system: 2
Local courts and prosecutors often determined the claims that would be
heard in the alternative projects, 3 and lawyers were often the
decisionmakers6 4
E. Conclusion: Beware of Non-legal Alternatives
In his conclusion Auerbach summarizes and elaborates his basic
findings:
[W]e are possessed of vastly more laws and lawyers than any
other society; we are also more concerned with lawlessness
than any other people. The more laws we have, of course,
the more laws will be broken; the more we then need the
services of lawyers and courts; the more congested the legal
system becomes; the more we yearn for alternatives; but the
less they are able to survive independently of legal
institutions.65
59 Id. at 123-24.
40 Auerbach makes this argument with regard to Native Americans, see id. at 12829, and, implicitly, with regard to the elderly, see id. at 127.
61 Id. at 135.
62 See id. at 130-31. There is a good body of literature on alternative projects as
extensions of the judicial system. See Freedman & Ray, State Legislation on Dispute
Resolution, 1 A.B.A. MONOGRAPH SERIES (1982). See generally R. TOMASIC & M.
FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTIcE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA (1982).

's J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 131.

' See id. at 132. Such projects did not follow the counsel of Edgar and Jean
Cahn, two early proponents of alternative dispute resolution, who had distinguished
between intra-community disputes, which are best considered in a local mediative setting and grievances involving external actors or forms of control which require a court
for a forum and a judge for a decisionmaker. Id. at 116 (citing Cahn & Cahn, What
PriceJustice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927 (1966)).
6 J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 141-42.
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Auerbach wants to document this trend and suggests that we must
be skeptical about new alternatives to the legal system which are not
the result of the social patterns of a cohesive community, but rather
have been developed and imposed by the legal system itself:
Alternatives are designed to provide a safety valve, to siphon
discontent from courts. With the danger of political confrontation reduced, the ruling power of legal institutions is preserved, and the stability of the social system reinforced. Not
incidentally, alternatives prevent the use of courts for redistributive purposes in the interest of equality, by consigning
the rights of disadvantaged citizens to institutions with minimal power to enforce or protect them. It is, therefore, necessary to beware of the seductive appeal of alternative
institutions."
Like legal dispute resolution, non-legal alternatives are neither inherently just nor unjust. Only by looking at "social context and political
choice" can we determine whether the dispute resolution systems are
67
meeting the needs of the clientele.
Finally for Auerbach "[t]he historical progression is clear: from
community justice without formal legal institutions to the rule of law,
all too often without justice. But injustice without law is an even worse
possibility .
"8 And there he leaves us.
II.

A CRITIQUE OF AUERBACH: THE LIMITS OF BINARY ANALYSIS

By documenting the historical patterns of resolving disputes without lawyers Auerbach has performed a service to many audiences. For
the reformer the findings should be instructive. If Auerbach is correct
(and his book is convincing) that the movement to alternatives follows a
cyclical pattern allowing us to predict the movement from mediative or
arbitration alternatives to the promise of justice with law, then we
might think twice about non-judicial alternatives being the panacea for
many of our ills that are based on inequality. For reformers of the
future an awareness of this short-cycle pattern should dampen enthusiasm for solving problems by a simple change of menu, in or out of the
68 Id. at 144.
67 Id. at 144-45. In considering our own social context, Auerbach seems to conclude that both formal and informal methods of dispute resolution are bound to reinforce the social and economic inequalities already extant in America. See, e.g., id. at
136 (informal methods); id. at 143-44 (formal methods); see also supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
68 Id. at 146.
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courtroom.
For scholars, the book enables us to develop a deeper understanding of how legal culture becomes central to patterns of resource distribution-to the maintenance of inequalities as well as to the playing out
of competitive tensions between individualistic pursuits and communal
ideals.
The book is deceptively simple, and could only have been written
by a scholar deeply steeped in the materials on the varieties of religious,
ethnic, and class-based communities throughout our history. Auerbach
is committed to a perspective informed by several disciplines. In this
sense the book is an important contribution, but it is not a work without problems: problems that result from an ethnocentric acceptance of
questionable assumptions, and from falling into the grips of binary
thinking. The analytic framework of Justice Without Law? is binary:
solving disputes with or without lawyers, individualistic pursuits versus
communal ideals, the Haves versus the Have-Nots, litigious Americans
versus non-litigious others. As a result Auerbach moves only to and fro,
hesistantly moving away from alternatives toward judicial reform, away
from a community-determined view toward a law-centric view of the
path to justice. Unfortunately, he never quite jumps off the teeter-totter
and onto the playground.
A.

Unexamined Assumptions

Let me start by suggesting how a comparative perspective could
have been used to examine the assumption that is perhaps most central
to Auerbach's analysis of dispute settlement reform movements in the
United States. 9 This assumption is that Americans are more concerned
with the preservation of individual rights than with community values
and so are "the most legalistic and litigious society in the world." 70° For
11 It is also interesting to note how a comparative perspective would inform an
understanding of access to law in society.
From a comparative perspective, it is clear that access to law, access
to publicly supported forums, is not available in all societies. The notion
that people in all primitive societies have access to forums for justice is a
romantic one, nothing more. In studies of villages from New Guinea to
Turkey to Sweden where no forums are locally available, self-help predominates, rather than resort to third party remedy agents.
Nader, The Direction of Law and the Development of Extra-JudicialProcesses in Nation State Societies in CROSS-EXAMINATIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MAX GLUCKMAN
92 (P. Gulliver ed. 1978).
"0J.AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 3. The assumption that Americans are, to quote
Chief Justice Warren Burger, "inherently litigious" rarely is challenged. See R. KAGAN, supra note 5. But see J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981) (concluding that we are not litigious and that litigation in a democracy is necessary to promote
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Auerbach, "the essence of communal existence" is "mutual access, responsibility, and trust.'

'

The loss of these values in modern America is

then directly related to its large amount of disputing as well as to its
problems of inadequate access to justice.7" Auerbach contrasts America
where "individualism" has allowed "the freedom to compete, acquire,
possess, and bequeath" with "traditional societies

. .

.[where] mutual

responsibility is encouraged."' 4
Unfortunately, even a cursory examination of the literature on disputing would show that Auerbach's central assumption is simply
wrong. First, nothing requires that individualism and competitiveness
be coupled with disorder and contentiousness. Anthropologists have
studied both contentious and noncontentious small communities; some
are based on trust, others on mistrust."5 Usually, explanations of what
.makes people litigate are not single stranded. For example, the noncontentious, but rights-conscious Zapotec could also be described as individualistic, competitive, and commercially minded. Yet they are also
communalistic and cooperative. Fully persuasive explanations of the
urge to litigate, therefore, have to be found in a society's social order.
More important, however, is Auerbach's failure to document the
second part of his assumption, which is that Americans suffer from
hyperlexis and belong, in fact, to the world's most litigious society.7 6
This assertion is not supported by any primary or secondary sources.
Actually, substantial evidence, including an important new study, suggests that litigation, taking a dispute to a third party, is not great in
proportion to the population and the need in America.77 For example,
change).

Corporate America, however, might be litigious. The American Bar Association
has estimated the annual cost of intercorporate litigation and discovery at eighty billion
dollars. Moreover, newspaper articles indicate that corporate America is using in-house
counsel and is exploring alternatives to court with reckless abandon. See Kill All the
Lawyers? Maybe There's an Alternative, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 30, col. 1;
Putting Litigation on a Budget, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1982, at D1, col. 3.
71 J.AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 4.
72 Id. at 3, 7-8.
73

Id. at 140.

74 Id. at 10.

71 There is ample evidence of the range in community style-from antagonistic
and hostile to cooperative. See THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SociETIES (L.
Nader & H. Todd eds. 1978). Auerbach's use of the term community vascillates. At
times he apparently sees all communities as based on the harmony model, yet he also
recognizes that the comparative study of communities indicates a tremendous range of
community style.

J.AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 3.
See Best & Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases:A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW &
76
"

Soc'y REv.701, 713 (1977) ("Households used third parties as complaint handlers in
1.2 percent of all cases in which consumers perceived problems with purchases, and 3.7
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Friedman and Percival examined the case load of trial courts in two
counties in California between 1890 and 1970.8 The study documented
the relative disappearance of dispute settlement from the courts and the
increasing use of the same courts for handling routine administrative
cases. 7 They suggest that routinization accompanies a lowering of the
public demand for settlement of disputes in formal courts. Their findings do not describe a country that is hyperlexic, but rather one that is
characterized by an expanding business community for whom disputing
may mean interruption in the flow of trade. The demand for disputing
mechanisms increases with an expanding society and with increasing
centralization of economic control. In the United States, the demand
was met through an expansion of extrajudicialmechanisms rather than
through an expansion of adjudicative courts or a massive effort at
prevention."0
percent of all instances in which consumers who noticed problems voiced complaints.");

Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 3 (1983).
Most disputes in the United States are dealt with by negotiation. See Johnson &

Drew, This Nation Has Money for Everything-Except Its Courts,JUDGES J., Summer
1978, at 8. Johnson & Drew report that the United States spends proportionately more
on police and prosecution than on courts (in contrast to seven other industrial nations),
and that United States judicial manpower is smaller than all but two of the countries
studied (USA, Canada, England, Wales, France, Italy, Sweden, and West Germany).
Litigiousness, they say, cannot explain why public investment in judicial systems is
inadequate.
Comparative studies of divorce rates are also interesting to consider. During the
1950's, when American family specialists were worried as to what they thought was the
precipitous rise in divorce, anthropologist G.P. Murdock examined marital stability in
several dozen societies. The United States fell about midway on a cross-cultural sample-well within the range of normal according to Murdock.
78 Friedman & Percival, supra note 7.
79 Id. at 296, 301. The authors define routine administration in the following
way:
Routine administration means the processing or approving of undisputed
matters. Courts make and keep records, register formalities, stamp their
approval on claims or on changes of status; they handle uncontested divorces; render judgment in cases of petty debt; probate uncontested wills;
handle petitions for change of name. In these matters there is almost never
any real dispute-at least none that comes before the court. When husband or wife files for divorce, there has usually been some dispute; but the
court does not resolve it. Typically, the parties do not go to court at all,
until they have worked matters out and are ready for the rubber stamp.
Routine administrationis not a characteristic of the social harmony
courts described by anthropologists. It is a modern, Western phenomenon.
Societies that are bureaucratic and busy need this kind of formalization far
more than hunters and gatherers do.
Id. at 270-71 (footnote omitted).
80 Friedman and Percival implicitly raise the question why an expansion of adju-
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The inaccuracy of Auerbach's central assumption has important
consequences both for this work and for the future of non-legal alternative dispute resolution. It must be recognized that the assumption that
American society makes too many demands on the judicial system was
also crucial to the Pound Conference's conclusion that alternative dispute resolution ought to be encouraged."" Proponents of this assertion
have simply not met their burden of proof. Nevertheless, general acceptance of the assertion has encouraged us to think that somehow we
as a nation are suffering from some disease that needs to be treated.
Before we proceed with a "cure," however, we should be sure the disease exists.
B.

The Relationship Between Law and Social Order

In the face of the questions raised by the studies mentioned above
and Auerbach's failure to refer to any supporting evidence, at least we
should be able to agree that there is presently no way of knowing
whether litigiousness is out of control in the United States. Regardless
of whether non-legal alternatives are actually necessary to deal with an
explosion of litigation, however, we still need to explain why there has
been an effort to shift dispute resolution from the courts to non-judicial
settings that are still under the control of the legal system. The standard rationale-that the courts are overburdened-is simply
insufficient.
What is missing in Auerbach's conclusion and in much of the
literature on disputing is an explicit statement on the interrelation between law and the social order. Once we describe alternating cycles
between adjudication and mediation we need to ask when do changes in
the legal order arise out of changes in the social order? It is not enough
to center on relationships (communal or individualistic). Instead, we
must ask what social, economic, and political forces work in the creation of a marginal law that plays a central role in this society? What
kind of a society provides the background for Auerbach's questions
about the recurrent enthusiasm for alternatives? Where is the context
which might give us a clue as to the theories necessary to explain the
phenomena that he isolated? 2
dicative courts was not considered as an option. See id. at 298. One could also ask why
we have opted for alternatives instead of watering down rights.
51 See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 123.
82 These are questions that Auerbach might have raised had he approached his
work from a more clearly defined theoretical perspective. For example, Poulantzas and
Habermas have both developed theories of the state which include the notion of the
relative independence of the state. The legitimacy crisis which Habermas notes in late
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Let me offer two examples of this kind of analysis. When Vilhelm
Aubert described the shift in the use of courts over a 100-year period in
Norway, he also noted a movement away from the use of the courts
toward the use of administative agencies. Aubert sought an explanation
for this change in the structure of the Norwegian welfare state. 8 Similarly, in developing African countries, Elizabeth Colson and later Richard Abel described the change in courts from their traditional function
in maintaining law and order to "development," leading to a decline in
tribal litigation. 4
Auerbach does hint at the relation between law and social order.
When he speaks about a major break in the way in which alternatives
were perceived and used during the post-Civil War period, a time
when alternative dispute resolution was undergoing a legalization process, he tells us something about the role of the legal profession and of
the state.8 5 But where is the analysis of alternative dispute resolution in
relation to the economic forces of the period, the power differentials,
and the massive effect of ideologies that colored the period? Those of us
who have worked on disputing processes often get so tied up in the
legal processes themselves that we forget the importance of the social
and cultural structure that produces the problem in the first place."
My own research on complaining in the United States covered
much of the same ground as the latter half of Auerbach's book.87 My
questions were about relations, power, and economics: Is there something about the way an industrial society handles so-called minor disputes that is organizationally and structurally different from the handling of similar problems in the small face-to-face societies that
anthropologists have traditionally studied? Are the differences linked to
variables such as stranger relations, stratification, the movement from
status to contract, economic development, and a certain type of industrialization? Are the similarities linked by type of relationship (equal/
unequal, consumer/producer, face-to-face/faceless) or to the limits incapitalist society develops as the state assumes greater importance without having the
power to change the direction of the society. The result is that the state, and presumably the legal system as well, is constantly reacting to change rather than initiating
change. The oscillations between formality and informality described by Auerbach can
be viewed as movements within this crisis situation. See J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION
CRISIS

(1973); N.

POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, AND SOCIALISM (1980).

83 See Aubert, supra note 7.

I" See Abel, supra note 7; Colson, From Chiefs Court to Local Court, POL. ANTHRO., Mar. 1976, at 15.
85 See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 57-60.
86 See M. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVrrY (1975) (describing the nineteenth century process of professionalization of American social science that led to centralized power and control over complex economic and social processes).
87 No AccEss TO LAW (L. Nader ed. 1980).
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herent in certain modes of complaint handling? And do conditions of
the presence of state law, growing industrialization, and changing production and consumption patterns have durable effects on dispute
resolution?
As indicated in this research, various dimensions of social change
occurred over the past 150 years: the relational (from a society based on
primary relations to one where relations between strangers characterize
the majority of real and potential disputes); the procedural (the direction of change toward more law and fewer remedies);"8 the political
(state monopoly on social control atrophies public opinion as control
and places remedies beyond the reach of complainants); the economic
(the directions described above have been triggered by an economic
revolution, the center of which has been the changing relation between
consumer and producer), and the ideological (the crystalization of an
ideology that legitimizes the concentration of power and authorizes the
dominant powers). 9 The crucial relationship is between economic
modes of production and consumption and the organization of social
control mechanisms.
C.

Limiting the Scope of Analysis

Justice Without Law? also fails as a sophisticated analysis because
it, like other works, does not treat power as a central variable in its
study of the disputing process.90 Students of the dispute resolution process need to recognize that in any particular dispute one party may be
of higher rank and power than another, and that such differences may
88 Auerbach recognizes this shift toward a law more concerned with procedure
than substance in a number of places in the book. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, supra note
1, at 11, 143. Auerbach also believes that non-legal alternatives are moving in the same
direction. See id. at 15 ("while the forms of alternative dispute settlement still flourish,
its substance recedes to the vanishing point").
In another context I argued that:

A nation such as the United States which is dominated by contract relationships and which also pays less attention to the ethical implication of
cases, is developing a law that is predominantly mechanical and that may
be moving in the direction of a law which is no longer pertinent to the
needs of the many.
Nader, supra note 69, at 95.
9 The importance of ideology is discussed below. See infra note 95 and accompanying and following text.
90 See Nader, From Disputing to Complaining in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY
OF SOCIAL CONTROL 71 (D. Black ed. 1983). Indeed, Felstiner has argued that social

conditions determine forms of dispute processing for reasons of good fit. See Felstiner,
Influences of Social Organizationon Dispute Processing,9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 63, 7685 (1974).
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be determinative."1 They must also recognize, however, that some parties are so powerless in terms of economic and political resources and
procedural access that their grievances are never voiced and consequently are not processed, resolved, managed, or settled.92 A focus on
the different modes of dispute resolution will only be marginally productive in terms of theory building, unless those dispute resolution
structures are seen as a subset of a larger system of controlling
processes which has to include the unilateral resolution of complaints.9"
Auerbach's book neglects the crucial necessity of placing dispute resolution within the context of the society in which it exists.
It is from history that the model of controlling processes is best
illustrated. The historical events that have resulted in the present system of processing economic grievances in the United States are a necessary part of any contextual, descriptive theory of alternatives. Three
hundred years ago most people living in what is now the United States
were both consumers and producers; dependency was not a critical variable. As the country's primary economic activity changed from subsistence agriculture to industrial production, and the roles of consumer
and producer diverged, the balance of power shifted. The absolute
power that consumers had previously enjoyed diminished. By the latter
part of the nineteenth century, the disparities in power between producers and consumers were reflected in the former's superior ability to
organize personnel and resources, and to conduct effective political lob9' Auerbach is sensitive to the importance of this dispute-specific power differential. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 125 (uneven distribution of economic power
between a customer and a company serves the company's interests in small claims
court); see also supra note 67.
92 Felstiner has identified this response of large numbers of individuals as "lumping it":
Between outsiders who have some contact with a large organization

and the organization, a significant amount of dispute processing may be a
special form of avoidance termed "lumping it." In lumping it the salience
of the dispute is reduced not so much by limiting the contacts between the
disputants, but by ignoring the dispute, by declining to take any or much
action in response to the controversy. The complaint against the retail
merchant or the health insurance company is foregone although the complainant's grievance has not been satisfied, or even acknowledged, and al-

though interaction between the individual and the organization is not altered. It would be uncommon for such grievances to be mediated since
there is little incentive for the organization to change its posture. Because
of the discrepancy in size and power even the threat of withdrawal by the
individual is futile to coerce compromise by the organization. And no adjudication short of the government courts may be possible because no other
power exists to coerce decisions against the organization.
Felstiner, supra note 90, at 81 (footnote omitted).
93Unilateral complaint resolution includes lumping it, avoidance, and coercion.

See supra note 2.
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bying. Moreover, the number of complaints received and left unsettled,
and the number of social movements created to remedy this power
shift-for example the small claims courts, the regulatory agencies, and
legal aid-all testify starkly to the power of producers over consumers.
Although the battle between producers and consumers was well
underway in the nineteenth century, the state did not become an active
participant in mediating issues raised by consumers until the latter part
of that century, and then took an interest that extended only to the
protection of society's basic needs. Adulteration in food stuffs, false advertising, and the precipitous rise in prices were all issues that were
viewed by the government as a set of concerns common to a class of
people. They were addressed by government not as individual problems
but as class problems to be remedied by legislative and regulatory
means.
By the twentieth century, the absolute power positions of consumers, producers, and government had changed. Now, both organized producers and organized government have considerably more power than
dispersed consumers. This great disparity in power was caused by the
departure of producers from the immediate social field of consumers
which destroyed the latter's informal social control system. The almost
total dependency of consumers on producers that accompanied this
change created a new role for government. In this sense, modern industrial nations (of whatever political persuasion) are generically different
from the face-to-face societies we have studied in the past.
In the evolution of legal relations concerning consumers' expressions of grievances about products and services, this history was reflected in a movement from dyadic to unilateral procedures: from disputing to actions of voicing complaints or resorting to avoidance or selfhelp strategies instead. As the power differential between parties to economic grievances has widened, aggrieved consumers are compelled to
seek out their adversaries and do battle using weapons designed by producers. It is producers, not consumers, and not the government, that
determine, support, and use the majority of complaint alternatives in
the United States.
During this period of change, ideology played an important role in
diverting attention from the problems of unequal power, in insuring
continuity, and in glossing contradictions. The ideology expressing the
value that everyone is equal before the law obscures the reality that the
consumer occupies a role with inherently weaker bargaining power."
" Auerbach mentions the problem of ideology. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1,
at 142-44. Although the analysis is not fully developed, Auerbach does state that:
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The idea that confidentiality protects us all is also part of a produceroriented complaint system; the control of information is an important
basis of power. Confidentiality of complaints,, known only to the producer, in a market where it is impossible for consumers to be adequately informed, prevents them from learning from the experience of
others and from seeing themselves as part of an offended group. The
idea of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) meant that the sale of
goods was to be a private affair between the parties. The concept. of
caveat emptor is based on the assumption that a buyer and seller have
equal bargaining power. The ideology that complaint cases should have
custom treatment has encouraged legal scholars to be concerned with
the conditions of microjustice-a costly focus on particular plaintiffs
and defendants-rather than with macrojustice-in which cases are
viewed in the aggregate and through which the broad consequences of
laws and legal institutions are analyzed. 95 A producer ideology includes
a view of the complainant as malcontent and deviant0e and a conception
of the state and only the state as the guardian of public rights, with a
mandate to bring legal action to protect the general welfare, as, for
example, when it sues a drug company for selling harmful drugs. The
same ideology is reflected in vesting corporations with many of the
rights and privileges of "persons." The very nature of a corporation,
however, reduces the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed against
"natural persons." A corporation, for example, cannot go to jail.9 7
The ideologies that I sketch here are interwoven with the economic
and political realities which I described earlier, and operate to manage
or control the "disorder" that may arise from those realities. From this
Throughout the twentieth century, as judges and lawyers have monotonously conceded, legal institutions have defaulted on their obligation to
provide justice to all. This. is surely because the ideal of equal justice is
incompatible with the social realities of unequal wealth, power, and opportunity, which no amount of legal formalism can disguise.
Id. at 143-44.
9' Auerbach also is aware of the process of the disaggregation of claims, particularly by requiring that individuals proceed with non-legal dispute processing. See id. at
126 ("compulsory consumer arbitration undercut the threat of class-action litigation").
There is a suggestion that this disaggregation was brought about to serve the interests
of the legal community. See id. at 135-36.
" Auerbach states that dispute settlement processes "isolate[ ] disputants" and
"likely" result in "delendency and passivity." Id. at 12. This feeling of isolation or
deviancy is related to the status of the individual: "[Ulsing a third party seems to have
some stigma associated which decreases with increased education and income. This
means that households of low socio-economic status receive less than their fair share of
remedies for purchase failures." Nader, supra note 69, at 89 (citation omitted).
See Stone, Stalking the Wild ,Corporation, 4 WORKING PAPERS FOR NEW
Soc'y 17 (1976); see also Nader & Shugart, Old Solutions for Old Problems in No
AccEss TO LAW 57 (L. Nader ed. 1980).
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broader perpective, litigiousness as suggested by Auerbach is hardly the
problem." Rather, we should be most concerned about why people opt
out of the legal system. If Marc Galanter's argument, that the American legal system is operating to fulfill the interests of the organizations,
the Haves, the repeat players, as against the interests of the Have-Nots,
is correct, then one would expect that the Have-Nots would not turn to
the legal system."" So, too, it may be sociological savvy that discourages
people from using extra-judicial alternatives for dispute resolution
which at best allow negotiation between parties of dramatically unequal status and power. Business corporations benefit from resolving
disputes in non-judicial settings possibly to an even greater degree than
they benefit in the courthouse.1"'
In a manuscript, "Changing the Law, Changing the Society-Toward an Explanation of the Dispute-Settlement Process in the
American Legal System," Egyptian law professor M. Nour Farahat
has stated the problem most cogently. He argues that "the real dilemma of the disputing process literature in the United States, is its
search for a convenient alternative to the official legal system while
keeping the whole system of socio-economic relations untouched." He
asserts that this swing to alternatives in search of justice will fail because "in order to change the law, it is necessary to change the
society." 1' o
" In fact, even if Americans were overly litigious, this broader perspective would
continue to urge that our real problem is that the important claims of individual consumers are not being properly resolved, either legally or non-legally.
99 See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974). Although Felstiner also argued that
people do not use third parties to resolve disputes (they prefer to lump it) he believed
that this non-use results from a better fit with such individuals' needs. See Felstiner,
supra note 91. Felstiner's argument lacks an awareness that such individuals may also
recognize that the Haves come out ahead and therefore have decided not to bother with
the disputing systems.
100 See J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 125 (small claims court benefits companies); id. at 128 (housing courts serve landlords' interests).
101 Farahat, Changing the Law, Changing the Society-Toward an Explanation
of the Dispute-Settlement Process in the American Legal System 16-18 (1983) (manuscript on file at the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review). The theory Farahat poses
to explain the phenomenon of alternatives combines the theories of Maine, Pound,
Kant, and some of the contemporary authors mentioned in this paper. He posits:
[W]hen the society undergoes relative social stability . . ., where there is
conformity of the relations of production with the powers of production
...and where the equilibrium is prevailing between the sociableness and
unsociableness of men. . ., the legal thought tends to be a mere justification of the formal valid legal system . . . .On the other hand, when the
society undergoes a period of social change . . ., where a major contradiction occurs between the relations of production and the powers of production . . ., and where the unsociableness . . . is affecting the social relations . . ., the legal thought tends to trespass on the official legal rules, to
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To address the problems in dispute resolution in this society, or in
any other, I believe that it is necessary to follow Farahat's advice. We
must recognize disputing for what it is: a piece of a much larger society. A debate that is limited to the choice of legal or non-legal alternatives divorced from the political, social, and ideological background of
the problem is of limited value. To address the problem effectively will
require more than a debate among lawyers centered on concerns of judicial efficiency. It will require an approach that considers disputing in
the context in which it is embedded. This approach will obviously entail expanding the limits of the debate to include concerns not normally
the fare of legal scholars. But it is only with an approach that unites
the different fields involved that we can hope finally to provide meaningful analysis of the justice problem.
III.

CONCLUSION

As an interpretive critique of the "dispute resolution industry's"
failure to remedy the problems associated with the justice system in
America, Auerbach's Justice Without Law? is a good summary of how
this industry is currently being judged. As an exploration of recurrent
oscillations in the treatment of disputes between parties in the United
States over a 350-year period Auerbach's work is original. As an analysis providing explanations why dispute resolution processes are evolving
in particular directions, it is missing the depth of either a jurisprudential interpretation or a socio-anthropological approach that would reveal that the oscillations he describes are part of the political andeconomic history of the United States. If Auerbach had taken this
approach his policy recommendations might have taken a different
turn, not toward a judicial solution, and not toward individual justice,
but toward aggregate solutions that join the remedy for particular cases
with prevention. 2 It is prevention, not dispute resolution, that will
resolve the contradictions between producer ideals (for example, "we
criticize them, and to look for another legal system which may be more
responsive to the changing social needs: in such periods, the legal thought
becomes less formal and more substantive.
Id. at 11-12.
102 Karl Klare has noted that "[t]he preeminent characteristic of modem legal
consciousness, transcending all political battlelines, is its unreflective and uncritical
quality, its attempt to accommodate yet obscure the contradictions of legal thought,
which reflect the contradictions of social life in late capitalist society." Klare, Judicial
Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 336 (1978). The reliance on judicial and individualistic solutions is an inherent feature of the "modern legal consciousness." It reflects
the use of law to divide and seperate competing power structures.
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are all equal before the law") and consumer realities (for example, unequal bargaining power). In this context the oscillation from judicial to
non-judicial becomes another attempt to "cool out the mark" in hopes
of things getting better as a result of the latest reform direction. I myself once said that disputing without the force of law is a lost battle.'0 3
At this point I would go further to argue that a judicial remedy is not
possible without bringing the economic system in line with judicial
ideals.

103 Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979).

